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COMMENT
RIGHT TO A FREE TRANSCRIPT IN
LOUISIANA CRIMINAL CASES
In 1956 the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. illi-
nois1 held that a state cannot deny an adequate appeal to an
indigent defendant convicted of a felony by imposition of pro-
hibitive costs.2  This Comment will analyze Griffin and later
decisions, considering their impact on Louisiana criminal pro-
cedure.
THE GRIFFIN DECISION
Although Griffin recognized that defendants have no consti-
tutional right to appeal in criminal cases3 it held that a state
which provides a criminal appellate procedure cannot preclude
indigent defendants from obtaining an adequate appeal by im-
posing monetary requirements. 4 If adequate review requires a
complete transcript of the proceedings, the state - at least in
1. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
2. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated: "Plainly the ability
to pay cost [of a transcript] in advance bears no rational relationship to a de-
fendant's guilt or innocence and could not be used as an excuse to deprive a de-
fendant of a fair trial . . . . Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to
affording equal justice to all and . . . there can be no equal justice where the
kind of a trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Id. at 17-19.
Stanley E. Qua, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, has expressed the opinion that Griffin stands for the proposition that:
"If a state provides for appellate review it cannot lay down a procedure that
requires the payment of money which indigent persons may be unable to pay,
unless it provides an alternative that affords an adequate and effective review to
such persons." Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. Cni. L. REV. 143, 146 (1957).
3. In the Griffin opinion the Court stated: "It is true that a State is not re-
quired by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appel-
late review at all." 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). For years McKane v. Durston, 153
U.S. 684 (1894), has been cited for the proposition that a state is not constitu-
tionally required to provide appellate judicial systems. It is submitted, however,
that since the McKane decision was rendered at a time prior to England's adop-
tion of the first modern criminal appellate system in 1907 [7 Edw. VII, c. 23
(1907)], and only shortly after the United States' establishment of discretionary
authorization of writs of error by Circuit Courts in criminal cases [20 Stat. 354,
c. 176 (1879)], the rule of the McKane case may be subject to reconsideration
today. Due process "is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time . . . . Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by
law for that feeling of just treatment which has evolved through centuries . . .
'due process' cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula
. . . Due process . . . a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the
exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding
of the process." Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Commit-
tee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951). Perhaps due process now requires
states to provide more protection than a trial court's hearing and decision.
4. 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
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felony cases similar to those which were under consideration in
Griffin -must provide a free transcript for the indigent appel-
lant." Whether a free transcript must likewise be furnished an
indigent defendant convicted of a misdemeanor is open to some
question. The answer may depend upon whether the Court
rested its Griffin decision on "due process," "equal protection,"
or both; a clear indication is lacking.6
The Court in Griffin conceded that an appeal is a privilege
granted by statute and not required by due process.7 If the ab-
sence of a system of appellate review is not a denial of due proc-
ess, then it is arguable that an inadequate system would not be
a denial either. 8 Under this premise Griffin must be pitched on
5. However, it has recently been stated that "alternative methods of reporting
trial proceedings are permissible if they place before the appellate court an equiva-
lent report of the events at trial from which the appellant's contentions arise. A
statement of facts agreed to by both sides, a full narrative statement based per-
haps on the trial judge's minutes taken during trial or on a court reporter's un-
transcribed notes, or a bystander's bill of exceptions might all be adequate sub-
stitutes, equally as good as a transcript. Moreover, part or all of the stenographic
transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the appeal,
and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such cir-
cumstances. If, for instance, the points urged relate only to the validity of the
statute or the sufficiency of the indictment upon which the conviction was predi-
cated, the transcript is irrelevant and need not be provided. If the assignments
of error go only to rulings on evidence or to its sufficiency, the transcript pro-
vided might well be limited to the portions relevant to such issues." Draper v.
Washington, 83 Sup. Ct. 774, 779 (1963).
For discussion of the question when a complete transcript is necessary for an
adequate appeal in Louisiana, see text accompanying notes 18-38 infra.
6. Nowhere in the opinion is the precise ground for the decision stated. The
Court states: "The sole question . .. to [be decided] is whether due process or
equal protection has been violated." 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956). However, the Court
concludes: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets de-
pends on the amount of money he has." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 19.
Lane v. Brown, 83 Sup. Ct. 768 (1963) ; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959)
United States ex rel. Weston v. Sigler, 308 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1962) support the
"equal protection" basis; however, State v. Delany, 332 P.2d 71 (Ore. 1958) sup-
ports the "due process basis. In Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962)
the Court indicates Griffin rests on both due process and equal protection.
7. 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). But see note 3 supra.
8. But see The Supreme Court's 1955 Term, 70 HlAv. L. REV. 90, 126-28
(1956) : "The Court in Griffin may have emerged with a new concept of equal
protection which will require a state to alleviate inequities even when they are
not the product of discriminatory policies. But an implication that the failure
to relieve inequities is equivalent to state enactment of a discriminatory policy
would appear to have consequences unintended by the Court ...
"[T]he Court probably did not intend its opinion in Griffin to have such a
sweeping effect. It seems more likely that the Court's conclusion was based upon
a weighing of the seriousness of precluding certain defendants in criminal cases
from obtaining appellate review against the value to Illinois of its practice of
requiring payment for a record on appeal. This approach analyzes equal protec-
tion in terms traditionally relevant to problems of due process. Although five
members of the Court felt that due process was not violated in this ease inasmuch
as a state may constitutionally abolish all appeals, this view overlooks the doc-
trine that a state may not attach arbitrary conditions to the grant of a privilege.
Nevertheless, it would seem preferable to view the problem as one of equal pro-
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equal-protection grounds. If misdemeanor appeals require a
.transcript, the indigent apparently would be denied the same
protection given the more affluent of the same class-misde-
meants- if he were not supplied a free transcript.9
If it is not a denial of equal protection to discriminate be-
tween indigent and non-indigent defendants, then Griffin rests
on due process; the "traditional notions of fair play" embodied
in due process may not require that provision for a free tran-
script be extended below felony cases.10 Additional support for
this proposition might have been gleaned by analogy from the
pre-1963 right-to-counsel cases; these held that due process re-
quired free counsel to be furnished only if the indigent defend-
ants were charged with capital crimes." By analogy, it could
have been argued that the free transcript requirement was lim-
tection, since the arbitrary condition in this case consisted of the denial of an
opportunity to a particular group." Cf. Comment, 55 MICH. L. REv. 413, 414-20
(1957).
9. Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. Cm. L REV. 143, 149 (1957) : "As the sep-
arate opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in the Griffin case points out, the Constitu-
tion applies to all cases, and there seems no logical reason why the rule should
not apply to [misdemeanor] cases as well as to more important ones. Yet a re-
quirement that the state provide a transcript costing possibly $200.00 for every
indigent defendant charged with drunkenness, even though he might be committed
for a couple of months to 'dry out,' to say nothing of charges of spitting on the
sidewalk, parking in forbidden areas, and a host of others, seems almost reductio
ad absurdum. . . . [S]uch a requirement might seriously impede the enforcement
of ordinary state police regulations."
The Griffin dissenters, Justices Burton, Minton, Reed, and Harlan argued
that all defendants should not be made economically equal, and pointed out that
denial of bail to an indigent defendant is not a denial of due process. 351 U.S.
12, 28-29 (1956).
10. Comment, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 161, 165 (1957). It is significant to note
that the Supreme Court pointed out in Griffin that a state did not have to furnish
a free transcript if other means of adequate appellate review are provided. 351
U.S. 12, 20 (1956).
If Griffin can be analyzed in terms of due process, it may be significant that
some states which furnish free transcripts limit the right to felony cases; e.g.,
Alabama, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, and Texas.
The latest statute dealing with the free transcript for the indigent defendant
is Proposed Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure § 57-12 (tent. final draft 1963),
which states: "(a) Upon imposition of any sentence in a criminal case a de-
fendant may file in the trial court a petition requesting that he be furnished with
a transcript of the proceedings at his trial. The petition shall be verified by the
petitioner and shall state facts showing that he was at the time of his conviction
and is at the time of filing the petition without financial means to pay for the
transcript. If the trial judge who imposed sentence or in his absence any judge
of the court finds that the defendant is without financial means with which to
obtain the transcript of the proceedings at his trial he shall order the Official
Court Reporter to transcribe his notes of the proceedings at the trial. The Re-
port of Proceedings shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court."
It would seem that the proposed Illinois statute grants a defendant convicted
even of a misdemeanor the privilege of requesting a free transcript.
11. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
471 (1945) ; Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945) ; Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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ited to felonycases as the right to counsel was limited to capital
cases. However, in Gideon v. Wainwright12 the United States
Supreme Court held that "any person hailed into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him." (Emphasis added.) i8 Gideon in-
volved a defendant charged with a non-capital felony. Thus, the
distinction formerly drawn between capital and noncapital
crimes in right-to-counsel cases is no longer viable. Does Gideon
destroy the prior analogical reasoning in free-transcript cases?
Due process decisions rest upon the weighing of a multiplicity
of factors. In determining whether due process requires the
furnishing of free transcripts in misdemeanor cases, the Su-
preme Court might consider that one court hearing is sufficient
to protect the misdemeanant's interest in the small penalty
which can be imposed upon him,14 while felons, faced with
graver penalties, must be permitted to pursue every available
means of attacking their conviction. Further, since the volume
of misdemeanor cases greatly exceeds that of felony cases, the
Court may be moved by the pragmatic consideration that to re-
quire free transcripts in misdemeanor cases would impose an
undue burden upon the public fisc.
Whether Griffin is retroactively effective is another unsolved
mystery. Only the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfur-
ter specifically endorsed such an application.'5 If Griffin is
given retroactive effect, an indigent defendant convicted prior
to Griffin and denied an appeal because he could not afford the
necessary transcript can seek release through habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.' 6 In Louisiana a writ of habeas corpus will not issue
12. 83 Sup. Ct. 792, 796 (1963).
13. Id. at 796.
14. This is because the right to appeal a misdemeanor conviction is dependent
upon the sentence imposed. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10, wherein it is
provided that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited in crim-
inal cases to instances in which the death penalty or imprisonment at hard labor
may be imposed, or a fine exceeding $300 or imprisonment exceeding six months
has actually been imposed.
It should be noted that if a trial judge does not want a defendant convicted
of a misdemeanor to appeal, he can accomplish this desire by a penalty of less
than $300 or six months.
15. 351 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1956). Former Chief Justice Qua of the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court expressed the same view: "I am .. . [unable] to adjust
myself to the idea that the Constitution ...gives a protection to a defendant ...
convicted on or after April 23, 1956, and denies that protection to a defendant
convicted in the same circumstances on April 22, 1956." Qua,' Griffin v. Illinois,
25 U. CHI. L. REv. 143, 150 (1957). Accord, Eskridge v. Washington, 358 U.S.
214 (1958).
16. If an indigent defendant has a right to a free transcript, but is denied it
and imprisoned, a habeas corpus proceeding would be proper. LA. R.S. 15:116
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unless the defendant has made a motion for a new trial which
specifically alleges grounds rendering the verdict contrary to
the law and evidence; in addition, he must have requested a
free transcript.17
IMPACT OF GRIFFIN IN LOUISIANA
The indigent defendant's right to a free transcript arises
only if the transcript is necessary for an adequate appeal. In
State v. Rideau' s the Louisiana Supreme Court denied a full
stenographic transcript because a complete bill of exceptions,
sufficient for an adequate appeal and available to the defendant,
had been reserved to each alleged trial irregularity. Hence, Grif-
fin will be applied in Louisiana only if the bill of exceptions will
not afford an adequate basis for appeal.1" Under Louisiana law
a defendant cannot require the transcribing of any evidence per-
taining to his guilt or innocence unless he can afford the cost
of having it transcribed ;20 he must rely on his bill of exceptions.
But in at least one instance - when the defendant alleges that
there was "no evidence" to sustain his conviction-a bill of ex-
ceptions is not adequate for appeal.
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a
defendant has the right to move for a new trial2' on the ground
that the verdict is contrary to the law and evidence. 22 Although
the Louisiana Supreme Court cannot review questions of fact in
criminal cases, 28 it will order a new trial when the record re-
veals that there is no evidence to sustain the conviction, 24 on the
(1950) states: "Whenever any person shall have been sentenced by a district
judge to an illegal imprisonment, such person shall have the right, subject to the
provisions of Article 137, to have issued by the supreme court, or any justice
thereof, a writ of habeas corpus." See also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958).
In a recent case, arising after Griffin, a court required that the indigent be
released, granted a new trial, or given a free transcript for his appeal. United
States em rel. Weston v. Sigler, 308 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1962).
17. See State v. Bueche, 243 La. 160, 142 So. 2d 381 (1962). See also text
accompanying note 31 infra.
18. 242 La. 431, 137 So. 2d 283 (1962).
19. Ibid., cert. granted, 83 Sup. Ct. 294 (1962), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1962-1963 Term - Criminal Law and Proce-
dure, 23 LA. L. REV. 398, 405 (1963). Accord, State v. Daley, 243 La. 760, 146
So. 2d 798 (1962). See also State v. Hayden, 243 La. 793, 147 So. 2d 392 (1962).
20. See text accompanying notes 29, 39 infra.
21. LA. R.S. 15:505 (1950).
22. Id. 15:509(1).
23. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
24. Prior to State v. Gatlin, 241 La. 321, 129 So. 2d 4 (1961), rather than
order a new trial, the Louisiana Supreme Court would discharge the defendant
when there was no evidence to support the conviction. State v. Linkletter, 239
La. 1000, 120 So. 2d 835 (1960) ; State v. Daniels, 236 La. 998, 109 So. 2d 896
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theory that such complete failure of proof presents a question of
law.25 The Court has held that no evidence exists if the prosecu-
tion has failed to submit any evidence of probative value,26 or
if there is complete lack of evidence of an essential element of
the crimeY.2  The proper procedure for presenting the issue of
no evidence is to move for a new trial, reserve a bill of excep-
tions to the overruling of that motion, and attach thereto all the
evidence introduced in the case.28
Under Article 500 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the bill
of exceptions must show the circumstances in which, and the
evidence upon which, the ruling complained of was rendered ;2
but under Article 555 other evidence relating to the guilt or in,
nocence of the accused cannot be transcribed in the bill unless
paid for by the defense.8 0 These statutory provisions do not by
their terms provide free transcripts to indigent defendants
claiming there was no evidence of an essential element of the
crime. It is submitted that Griffin compels the state to provide
a free transcript in this instance. State v. Bueche8 l recently held
that the mere allegation of "no evidence" of an essential element
(1959) ; State v. LaBorde, 234 La. 28, 99 So. 2d 11 (1958) ; State v. Sbisa, 232
La. 961, 95 So. 2d 619 (1957) ; State v. Harrell, 232 La. 35, 93 So. 2d 684
(1957).
25. For a discussion of these cases, see Comment, 19 LA. L. REV. 843 (1959).
26. State v. Linkletter, 239 La. 1000, 120 So. 2d 835 (1960) ; Mayerhafer v.
Department of Police, 235 La. 437, 104 So. 2d 163 (1958); State v. LaBorde,
234 La. 28, 99 So. 2d 11 (1958).
27. State v. Sbisa, 232 La. 961, 965, 95 So. 2d 619, 622 (1957) ; State v.
Daniels, 236 La. 998, 109 So. 2d 896 (1959).
28. State v. LaBorde, 234 La. 28, 32, 99 So. 2d 11, 12 (1958).
29. LA. R.S. 15:500 (1950) ; State v. Cooper, 241 La. 757, 760, 131 So. 2d
55, 56 (1961) ("evidence in a criminal case is part of the record when appended
to and made part of a perfected bill of exceptions").
30. LA. R.S. 15:555 (1950).
Former LA. R.S. 15:332.2 (Supp. 1961) (repealed 1962) provided:
"A. In all felony prosecutions in the district courts of the state, the entire
proceedings of the trial and the testimony shall be taken down and reported by
the official court reporter or by a reporter designated by the trial judge for that
purpose. In such cases, the reporter shall report verbatim, in shorthand, by ste-
nography or stenotype, or by voice recording or any other recognized manner when
the equipment therefor has been approved by the court, all proceedings of the
trial, including the testimony of all witnesses, the other evidence introduced or
offered, the objections thereto, and the rulings of the court thereon.
"B. Should an appeal be ordered or a writ of review granted, all such por-
tions of the reported proceedings or testimony as may be requested by either party
shall be transcribed by the reporter in such number of copies as is required by
the appellate court, and shall be filed with the clerk of court for incorporation
in the transcript of appeal." This provision was suspended by House Concurrent
Resolution No. 93 of the 1960 Regular Session, and then repealed by La. Acts
1962, No. 449, § 1.
LA. R.S. 13:4529 (1950) applies to cost of appeal, and does not encompass
the free transcript.
31. 243 La. 160, 142 So. 2d 381 (1962).
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of a crime will not entitle the defendant to a free transcript; the
defendant must point out the essential elements unsupported by
proof.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Griffin, recognized
that a free transcript should not be granted for a frivolous ap-
peal.32 Determining whether an appeal is frivolous necessitates
an examination of defendant's good faith and the actual neces-
sity for the transcript. The United States Supreme Court in
Johnson v. United States s3 permitted these issues to be decided
by the federal trial judge; however, Coppedge v. United States"4
later held that the trial court's determination of good faith is
not conclusive, but is "entitled to weight."3 5 In the latter case
the court also stated that if the issues sought to be raised by the
indigent are such that their substance cannot be ascertained
adequately without a transcript, the would-be appellant must
be supplied a transcript of sufficient completeness to enable him
to attack the trial court's certificate of lack of good faith and
establish his need for an appeal in forma pauperis.3 6
The net effect of the Johnson and Coppedge decisions is that
the federal trial judge has no discretion to deny a free transcript
to an indigent appellant on the ground that the appeal is frivo-
lous, 37 the appellate court must have the transcript before it to
review the trial court's determination of frivolity. The Cop-
pedge rule in federal criminal appeals was made applicable to
state procedures by Draper v. Washington;38 discretion to deny
32. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: "When a state . . .gives leave for ap-
pellate correction of trial errors ...it may protect itself so that frivolous appeals
are not subsidized and public moneys not needlessly spent." -351 U.S. 12, 24
(1956).
It is the position of one writer that: "As a matter of sound judicial adminis-
tration it would seem that the trial judge should not have the final say as to
whether his own alleged errors should be reversed. Very likely means can be de-
vised whereby obviously frivolous appeals can be dismissed without the expense
of a full transcript; but great caution should be exercised and the control should
be in the appellate court, or at least not in the same trial judge." Qua, Griffin
v. Illinois, 25 U. Cii. L. REv. 143, 149 (1957). See also Comment, 55 Micn. L.
REV. 413, 422 (1957).
33. 352 U.S. 565 (1957). An appeal in forma pauperis is allowed in federal
criminal trials pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1959). That statute also pro-
vides that the appeal in forma pauperis may not be taken if the "trial judge certi-
fies in writing that it is not taken in good faith." See also Comment, 25 U. CnI.
L. REv. 161, 168-69 (1957).
34. 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
35. Id. at 446.
36. Ibid.
37. See Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. Cm. L.
REv. 151, 159-60 (1957).
38. 83 Sup. Ct. 774 (1963).
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a free transcript to an indigent on the ground that his appeal
is frivolous cannot constitutionally lie with the state trial judge.
The present status of Griffin in Louisiana seems to be that a
free transcript must be supplied indigent defendants convicted
of felonies, and possibly misdemeanors, when they desire to ap-
peal their convictions on grounds of "no evidence." Although
the trial judge has no discretion to deny a transcript on the
ground that the appeal is frivolous, the defendant has no right
to a free transcript unless he has made a motion for a new trial
which precisely indicates which elements of the crime went un-
proven.
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